The Israel-US relationship shadowed all major war events. Throughout the fighting months, the two nations maintained a complex give-and-take dynamic, at times slipping into confrontations both covert and overt. “It was truly like a tug of war,” an Israeli source deeply involved in the intense negotiations with Washington described.
Israel Hayom's investigation, based on hours of in-depth conversations with Israeli sources who were members of the most intimate forums, aims to map out the web of relations between Israel and the US as it evolved during the war and behind closed doors.
Last week, we recounted how Israel managed to harness America's military might to deter Iran and Hezbollah, described America's staunch opposition to the ground entry into Gaza and to a preemptive strike in Lebanon, and concluded with the sharp struggle between Washington and Jerusalem over humanitarian aid to Gaza and the impending entry into Rafah. In this second part, we'll reveal why the Rafah entry was truly delayed, how National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan discovered the Iranian General Mahdavi's assassination, where the heavy bombs withheld by the White House are located, and how Jerusalem managed to persuade Washington to support the ground invasion of Lebanon.
“We chose to narrow gaps”
As early as January 2024, the IDF Chief of Staff instructed the Southern Command to prepare an operational plan to eliminate Hamas’ Rafah Brigade. However, the plan's implementation was delayed due to the prolonged operation in Khan Yunis, and in March, it was postponed again, this time due to a severe munitions shortage. The US was reluctant to supply Israel with these munitions due to its frustration over the lack of humanitarian aid to Gaza.
At this stage of the war, Israel suffered, among other things, from a stuttering American supply of 120mm tank shells, essential for continuing the fight. The situation was so critical that during that period, meetings were held between senior Israeli political and military officials on the munitions issue almost daily, with absolute compartmentalization to prevent the data from reaching Hezbollah or Iran and encouraging them to launch a preemptive attack. One attendee of these meetings reveals that even the aides of the participating politicians and senior officers were asked to leave the room for fear of leaks. Meanwhile, IDF tank commanders in the field were ordered to conserve as many shells as possible.
Even after Israel finally decided to enter Rafah “with what we had,” as an Israeli source put it, the decision's implementation was repeatedly postponed due to American pressure. On March 10, Biden stated in a television interview that an Israeli entry into Rafah would be a “red line,” and even an untrained ear could immediately understand that the US was sharpening its tone towards Israel. About two weeks later, Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived for another visit to Israel, participated in a cabinet discussion, and left disappointed. “You have no plan for evacuating the population and no plan for humanitarian aid,” he told the Israelis. All this occurred against the backdrop of approaching US presidential elections and mounting pressure on Biden from elements in the Democratic Party to end the war in Gaza.
The original plan formulated by the Southern Command for action in Rafah involved a pincer movement from north and south, which would trap Hamas terrorists inside the city. But the Americans, fearing images of massacre and starvation – “it was a political matter, not a value-based one,” a senior Israeli source analyzed – disliked this plan. Every attempt by the IDF to soften the plan, presented repeatedly to the Americans, ended in failure. “I studied the maps – these people (the civilians in Rafah) have nowhere to go,” Vice President Kamala Harris said in late March, threatening that an Israeli entry into Rafah would have “consequences.” A few days later, a Zoom meeting between Minister Ron Dermer, National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi, Sullivan, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken devolved into an ugly shouting match. The Americans were on the verge of explosion.
According to a military source, “We could have gone for Rafah in defiance of the US, but that would have led to non-supply of weapons or non-support at the UN. The political echelon instructed the IDF to “do Rafah with the Americans.” A political source confirmed, “We could have told the Americans ‘go to hell’, or we could have worked to narrow gaps with them. We chose to narrow gaps.”
Following the political echelon's directive, the IDF continued refining the operational plan for Rafah to meet American demands. According to a senior Israeli, this polishing process lasted about six weeks. He describes this period as a “tormenting tango dance” with the Americans. It now emerges that this “tango dance” was at the heart of the delay in entering Rafah, a topic that dominated public discourse in Israel during those days and turned into a political blame game, with the Chief of Staff as one of its victims.
The alternative plan eventually formulated by the IDF, after repeated refinements at Washington's request, was based on entering Rafah only from the south, along the Philadelphi Corridor. This would allow the civilian population (and thus also Hamas terrorists) to evacuate from the city more easily. When presenting the field moves to the Americans, they were not described as “tree maneuvers,” as defined in the Hebrew IDF orders, but as seizing a narrow strip along the Egyptian border and conducting “raids” northward. Once again, diplomacy was a matter of semantics. “We narrowed the gaps to the point where we could act against their opinion without breaking the tools,” an Israeli source explained.
Indeed, Israel ultimately acted without US approval. “He's a f***ing liar,” Biden reportedly said about Netanyahu after learning that the IDF had entered Rafah, according to an American report.
“Even a soccer game isn't won with a tie”
We'll return to the Rafah operation and its implications. But in the meantime, while the ground entry into the city was being delayed, the war's most Hollywood-esque scene unfolded.
One of the central figures in managing relations with Washington is Israel's Ambassador to the US, Mike Herzog. Herzog, together with the military attaché in Washington, Major General Hidai Zilberman, spent countless hours in recent months navigating the corridors of the White House, State Department, and Pentagon, attempting to soften American opposition to Israeli moves. His role reached its zenith in the lead-up to the Rafah entry, when Herzog would attend meetings with American officials, armed with aerial photographs and battle diagrams rolled up under his military secretary's arm, which he would present for approval.
On April 1, at 11 a.m. Washington time, Herzog and Zilberman were scheduled for another high-level coordination meeting ahead of the Rafah entry. This time, the duo was invited to the White House Situation Room, the same screen-filled space from which President Obama had overseen the bin Laden operation. An encrypted video call was to take place with the Kirya in Tel Aviv.
National Security Advisor Sullivan, President Biden's closest confidant, was set to head the table in Washington, with the administration's Middle East envoy, Brett McGurk, at his side. The remaining seats around the elongated table were occupied by representatives from the American intelligence community and a handful of tie-clad generals. On the Israeli side of the video call were Dermer, IDF Head of Operations Division Major General Oded Basiuk, a National Security Council representative, and others.
The meeting was supposed to focus on the Rafah entry plan, which was at the core of the dispute between the administration and Israel at that time. However, exactly one hour before the meeting's start, Israel eliminated Iranian General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the Quds Force's Syria and Lebanon Corps, without prior notice to the US. “The discussion was meant to be about Rafah, but an hour before, the Middle East turned upside down,” recounts someone familiar with the meeting details.
At one minute to 11, as Sullivan was about to enter the Situation Room and open the meeting, military attaché Zilberman intercepted him at the door threshold. “Sir, I need to tell you something,” he whispered. “We just eliminated the Iranian general responsible for Lebanon and Syria.” Sullivan's face blanched. “Sullivan was utterly unprepared for this update, to put it mildly,” a source privy to the meeting details said.
Israel knew the US would not welcome Zahedi's elimination and therefore didn't update them on the operation details in advance. Naturally, the Americans feared such an action would drag Iran into an all-out war, a scenario they had been trying to avoid since Oct. 2023. But Israel believed Iran wouldn't be drawn into war, partly because the assassination occurred in a building near the Iranian consulate in Damascus, not in the consulate itself.
However, the Iranians chose not to leverage the deniability option given to them this time. They claimed the assassination was carried out in a building officially belonging to the consulate, effectively an Israeli attack on Iranian soil. Tehran also promised a forceful response, much to the Americans’ dismay. “We didn't anticipate the Iranian response,” an Israeli source candidly admitted, “but they constructed a narrative that gave them legitimacy to attack Israel directly.”
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv's Kirya now found themselves in a precarious situation. It was clear that to thwart the Iranian response to Mahdavi's elimination, Israel needed America by its side – the same America that wasn't updated on the assassination details and opposed the Israeli decision to enter Rafah. Once again, CENTCOM commander General Michael Kurilla, IDF Chief of Staff Halevi's close friend, was called to action. Immediately after Zahedi's elimination, Halevi briefed Kurilla on the attack details. A few days later, when the IDF began detecting signs of Iran preparing a counter-attack, Halevi called Kurilla again. “Everything we've built is now being put to the test,” the Israeli Chief of Staff told the CENTCOM commander.
Within hours, Kurilla informed Halevi he was preparing to come to Israel. That weekend, Kurilla landed in the country, joined a General Staff forum meeting, and descended to the operations pit. There, together with Halevi and the Air Force commander, he orchestrated the international coalition operation that would repel – almost entirely – the first-ever Iranian missile and UAV barrage aimed at Israel. The Americans proved they wouldn't abandon Israel in its hour of need, regardless of how much it tested their patience.
Following the Iranian attack, the US pressured Israel to refrain from its own response. “Take the win,” Biden told Netanyahu after it became clear that most Iranian missiles were intercepted en route to Israel, with minimal damage from the attack. In response, Dermer called Sullivan. “Even a soccer game isn't won with a tie,” he argued.
Israel's counter-attack on Iran was indeed minor, but according to Israeli sources, this wasn't solely due to American interests. There was a genuine fear in Jerusalem that escalation with Iran could spiral out of control. After a series of discussions, it was decided that the Air Force would target an S-300 air defense system radar near one of the nuclear facilities in Isfahan. According to a senior Israeli, the Iranians remain baffled as to how Israel managed to attack the radar.
“No disaster occurred”
Only after concluding the round with Iran, in early May, did Israel permit itself to launch a ground operation in Rafah. Almost daily, attaché Zilberman would present himself at the Pentagon, armed with aerial photographs of the ground movement. These images reassured the Americans, confirming that the IDF was operating cautiously and in line with agreed-upon plans. At one point, Zilberman showed his colleagues footage captured from inside an Israeli tank positioned on Rafah's outskirts. “See,” he told them, “we're inside the built-up area, and no disaster has occurred yet.”
The Americans were indeed placated, but not for long. Even earlier, in an attempt to prevent Israel's entry into Rafah, the US Department of Defense had blocked a weapons ship bound for Israel. This shipment included, among other items, heavy “2000-pound” bombs for the Air Force. A few days later, during Blinken's visit to Israel, he joined Gallant on a tour of the Kerem Shalom crossing, witnessing firsthand the humanitarian aid trucks entering Rafah. When Gallant inquired why the weapons ship wasn't departing, Blinken's response was surprising: “This is the first time I'm hearing about it.” Gallant found this hard to believe.
The American embargo on a specific weapons component for Israel remained below the public radar at this stage. Defense Minister Gallant, keenly aware of how crucial the heavy bombs were for continuing the fight, attempted to discreetly resolve the impasse. At June's end, following carefully conducted negotiations, Gallant was invited to meet his counterpart, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, in Washington. Gallant sensed this trip might break the deadlock and allow the weapons ship to sail. This wasn't mere conjecture: a week before the trip, McGurk called, saying Gallant needn't worry about a return ticket from Washington. “You can return with the ammunition ship,” the American quipped.
But in June, mere days before the trip and while Israel was already maneuvering in Rafah, Netanyahu released an English-language video directly criticizing the US administration for halting weapons shipments to Israel. The administration was incensed. Sullivan personally called Gallant, informing him that following Netanyahu's statements, the President had explicitly ordered the ship not to sail under any circumstances.
Gallant proceeded with his Washington trip, investing considerable time trying to secure the ammunition ship's release. After failing in this endeavor, he sought a meeting with Sullivan. However, the National Security Advisor was sequestered with President Biden at Camp David, preparing for a confrontation with Trump (the same confrontation that would eventually end Biden's campaign). Gallant delayed his return home, waiting for Sullivan in Washington, and finally met him at the White House. “These bombs are the IDF's workhorse,” he told Sullivan. “I had already convinced the President to release the ship despite the video,” Sullivan replied, “but then Netanyahu continued tweeting about the issue, and the President changed his mind.” This appears to have been the nadir in Israel-US relations during the war.
Undeterred, Gallant proposed a compromise solution. He requested that the bombs be transferred to Israel but arrive under the classification of emergency stock (“interim deployment”), which would prevent the IDF from using them. Eventually, the bombs did arrive in Israel and remain here, but the US has yet to authorize their use by the IDF, forcing it to manage without them. Israel hopes that Trump will reverse this decision.
Dramatic move
The Rafah operation reignited negotiation talks between Israel and Hamas, with the US deeply involved. By late May 2024, a draft agreement for hostage release and ceasefire emerged for the first time. According to an Israeli source, its formula closely resembled the agreement finally signed between the parties last week. The breakthrough in negotiations came after Hamas agreed, for the first time, to enter talks without first demanding an end to the war. “This was the first time I saw a real chance for an arrangement,” a senior Israeli revealed. “Suddenly, Hamas was willing to engage in stage A of the deal without ending the war.”
Unlike the previous hostage release agreement from November 2023, this new agreement was designed to span an extended period and include the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners with blood on their hands. This complexity significantly increased the challenge of continuing talks with Hamas. The negotiations, which also addressed the fate of the Philadelphi Corridor, matured towards July's end, coinciding with Netanyahu's visit to Washington and address to Congress.
However, on June 27, just three days after Netanyahu's Congressional speech, disaster struck. A Hezbollah mortar bomb, intended to hit the newly established IDF “Mountain Brigade” command post near Mount Hermon's lower cable car, missed its target. It slid down the mountain and detonated on a soccer field in Majdal Shams. This horrific tragedy claimed the lives of 12 children and teenagers.
The Majdal Shams disaster undoubtedly marked the war's most crucial turning point. It obliterated any chance for a hostage release agreement, as Hamas calculated that it would drag Israel and Hezbollah into a northern war – a scenario the Gaza-based terrorist organization had desired from the outset. Simultaneously, the timing of the Majdal Shams catastrophe, as the Rafah operation neared its conclusion, provided both the political echelon and the IDF with the tools and justification to shift the war's center of gravity from Gaza to Lebanon.
“Majdal Shams was the watershed moment,” a senior Israeli stated. “The Rafah maneuver was nearing completion, allowing for the transfer of forces northward. We were poised to focus on the north, and now we had justification for a move in Lebanon.”
After visiting the disaster site in Majdal Shams, Defense Minister Gallant returned to the Kirya and instructed the Chief of Staff to prepare for the elimination of Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah's Chief of Staff. This dramatic move validated Hamas’ assessment that Israel and Hezbollah were on a collision course.
Israel knew there was a brief window of opportunity to eliminate Shukr but couldn't pinpoint exactly when conditions would be optimal. By this time, intelligence indicated that Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh would be eliminated in the early hours of July 31 during his Tehran visit. Ultimately, the assassinations of Shukr and Haniyeh occurred within hours of each other. In both instances, the US received no prior notification.
“The close timing of the two assassinations was purely coincidental,” a senior Israeli explained. “We knew in advance about eliminating Haniyeh due to his Tehran visit, but with Shukr, we couldn't predict the exact timing.” Following the assassinations, Gallant conferred with Austin. “Iran will clearly respond,” the Defense Minister told his American counterpart. “If you want to prevent escalation, you must assist us with defense.”
Israel believed Hezbollah and Iran were coordinating their response to Shukr and Haniyeh's assassinations. “There were indications that Iran and Hezbollah would act jointly against us,” a senior Israeli revealed. “However, Nasrallah was tactically moderate yet strategically extreme. He was committed to our destruction but highly restrained and preoccupied with equations – weighing an attack in Beirut versus one in Tel Aviv, and so on.”
The counter-response to the assassinations was delayed, finally materializing in Oct. 2024.
“Operation after operation”
Even before the second Iranian attack, a series of audacious steps unfolded in Lebanon. On Sept. 17, the pagers operation erupted with a literal bang. The following day, Hezbollah's communication devices exploded, and the day after that, the Air Force launched operation “Northern Arrows,” during which the IDF destroyed hundreds of Hezbollah launchers.
The next day, without any prior discussion, Operations Division Head Oded Basyuk
entered the Defense Minister's office. Catching Gallant at the office door as he was leaving, Basyuk said, “We have an opportunity to eliminate Ibrahim Akil, along with the entire leadership of the Radwan force.”
That day, Sept. 20, the IDF assassinated senior Hezbollah official Akil in Beirut. Dozens of senior members of Hezbollah's elite Radwan force and figures from its operations division perished alongside him. “The events in Lebanon, from the pagers to Akil, unfolded without prior planning,” a senior Israeli admitted. “We didn't predetermine our end goal; instead, we conducted operation after operation.”
It seems even the Americans were astonished by the dizzying pace of events, which proceeded with them entirely out of the loop. In Lebanon, unlike Gaza in general and Rafah in particular, the Americans posed fewer obstacles to IDF operations. “Unlike Gaza, where it was politically challenging due to sympathy for Palestinians in the Democratic Party, there's no empathy for Hezbollah in the US,” a senior Israeli explained. “In Lebanon, Israeli and US interests are much more aligned.”
Indeed, Israel's moves in Lebanon during September's final days encountered almost no American interference. The US seemed to observe from the sidelines, almost admiringly. A week after Akil's assassination, on September 27, another opportunity arose – the chance to assassinate Nasrallah. “After Akil's assassination, we detected that Nasrallah was in psychological crisis,” a senior Israeli revealed. “But he still believed Israel wouldn't assassinate him. He thought he knew us, and he was mistaken.”
The Rashomon effect surrounding Nasrallah's assassination operation is particularly pronounced: almost everyone in Israel's top echelons, both political and military, claims they supported the assassination, while others opposed it. “What's clear is that Netanyahu saved Nasrallah in Oct. 2023 and killed him in Sept. 2024,” one insider summarized.
If the Americans had managed to stomach all of Israel's moves in Lebanon up to this point, Nasrallah's assassination was particularly hard to swallow. Israel knew the White House would be furious about the move, which would shake the entire Middle East, but decided to proceed anyway without coordination, partly fearing the operation might leak. “They'll be angry, but there won't be practical consequences,” Dermer predicted in the cabinet, and he was correct.
Softened terminology
The next major move Israel orchestrated began three days after Nasrallah's assassination – the ground maneuver beyond Lebanon's border fence. As expected, the Americans were unenthusiastic about Israel's military action, but as usual, someone managed to placate them.
Before the maneuver commenced, Chief of Staff Halevi conferred once more with his friend Kurilla. When Halevi informed the American general that the IDF planned to deploy three divisions into Lebanon, Kurilla's face darkened. When Halevi explained his intention to bring an entire brigade into Kfar Kila, adjacent to Metula, the American general could no longer remain silent.
“In the US Army, a brigade comprises 5,000 fighters. Is this the manpower you intend to bring into Kfar Kila?” Kurilla inquired. Halevi clarified that it wasn't. The Lebanon operation was planned on a scale of only hundreds of fighters. “So when briefing Washington, avoid using the term ‘brigade’,” Kurilla advised. “Discuss the number of soldiers and tanks instead. It'll be less alarming for them.”
Halevi complied. When the Lebanon operation plan was conveyed to Washington and presented to senior Americans, it didn't mention “brigade” or “division,” but only hundreds of soldiers and a few tanks. During translation into English, the IDF battle orders were also toned down, with terms like “ground operation” replaced by softer military terminology.
Those responsible for this included military attaché Zilberman, former IDF Spokesperson who understood the importance of branding, and current IDF Spokesperson Brigadier General Daniel Hagari. They decided to define the Lebanon move as “localized limited raids,” a term specifically crafted for the Pentagon, State Department, and White House. Zilberman even issued an official document to all senior IDF officers, emphasizing that this new, softened terminology should be used in all American communications.
As with Rafah, even after entering Lebanon, the IDF sent videos to the Americans, reassuring them that ground operations were progressing according to approved plans. Kurilla also received ongoing updates, videos, and real-time intelligence from the Kirya regarding the extent of weapons the IDF located along the Lebanon border fence.
The Lebanon move, as mentioned, was easier for the American side to accept than Israeli activity in Gaza. “But the pinnacle of coordination with the Americans throughout the war came after the second Iranian attack in Oct. 2024, when we decided to respond by striking inside Iran,” an Israeli source revealed. “In this case, we were fully coordinated on what, when, what to do, and what not to do, as well as our joint messaging following the attack.”
Before the attack, Halevi and Kurilla spoke again. The Israeli Chief of Staff presented the CENTCOM commander with several requests, without which the Israeli strike on Iran would have been impossible. Kurilla approved all requests, including scrambling American rescue teams who patrolled Middle Eastern skies in helicopters on the night of the attack, ready to assist any Israeli pilot forced to eject. This marked the first time in history that the US provided Israel with such assistance.
Interestingly, the close US-Israel coordination didn't emerge in a vacuum. Defense Minister Gallant, who spoke with his counterpart Austin during this period, informed him that Israel was determined to strike Iran aggressively, potentially triggering an all-out war. “If you don't want us targeting Iran's oil fields, grant my Chief of Staff what he's requesting,” Gallant stated.
In reality, Israel never intended to set Iran's oil fields ablaze. Only now, as the Biden administration neared the end of its term, it could be revealed that Gallant employed the “hold me back” tactic with Austin.
Regardless, Israel's actions in Lebanon, which significantly weakened Hezbollah, paved the way for regulatory talks between Israel and Lebanon, conducted by Amos Hochstein, the Biden administration's envoy. In Nov. 2024, following Trump's presidential election, Hochstein contacted Dermer. “Do you still want regulation?” he asked. Dermer's affirmative response was no coincidence: from the war's outset, Prime Minister Netanyahu's goal was to conclude northern hostilities with an arrangement allowing residents to return.
The Lebanon agreement, signed in late November, redirected attention to Gaza and the hostages. It was now evident to all parties that they were keen to restart negotiation talks. “The current hostage release agreement's origins lie in the Lebanon deal,” an Israeli source explained. “That's where Hamas realized they were essentially isolated.”
The Hamas talks, conducted under Hochstein and the Biden administration's auspices, progressed in “small steps,” according to that source, but already addressed specifics like withdrawal maps, names of released prisoners, and the outline of stages. Delays occurred, partly due to Israel's insistence on including 11 male hostages under the “wounded and sick” humanitarian category, enabling their release in the agreement's first stage (ultimately, nine men were included in this category).
Jerusalem, Qatar, Gaza
Trump's election and promises to rain “hell on Gaza” energized these talks. “It created an atmosphere that accelerated the already positive dynamics,” a person involved in the negotiations said.
The agreement was finalized through a series of moves last week, with both American administrations – outgoing and incoming – cooperating. The central figure on Trump's side was Jewish-American real estate tycoon Steve Witkoff, the incoming president's Middle East envoy. Witkoff was scheduled to arrive in Israel last Monday to meet Netanyahu personally and finalize the agreement details. At the Prime Minister's Office's request, Witkoff was asked to arrive earlier, on Saturday.
Contrary to various media reports, an Israeli source claims the timing of the Witkoff-Netanyahu meeting, which occurred Saturday afternoon, wasn't imposed on the Prime Minister. According to this source, the meeting was pre-arranged with the Prime Minister's Office and set up through Ron Dermer's staff, who was visiting the US at the time. During the meeting, Witkoff and Netanyahu conferenced with McGurk, the Biden administration's Middle East envoy. Afterward, Witkoff flew from Jerusalem to Qatar, meeting there with McGurk and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman. These three finalized the contacts between the Israeli delegation and Hamas, who occupied separate floors in the same Doha building, communicating via Qatari and Egyptian intermediaries.
Witkoff and McGurk remained in Qatar until Thursday, then felt secure enough to return to the US. The following day, after some final hurdles, the agreement was signed. According to an Israeli source, both the Biden and Trump administrations concurred that if Israel and Hamas failed to reach agreements on the deal's second stage, Israel would resume fighting in Gaza. “But it's clear that under a Trump administration, this would be easier than under Biden,” he noted.
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