The “Palestine Branch” operates as Iran's primary liaison unit with Palestinian terror organizations, with Hamas being its main focus. Under the leadership of Saeed Izadi, this unit coordinates weapons smuggling, provides financial support, conducts training for terror groups in Gaza and the West Bank, and managed relations between Hamas and the Assad regime in Syria until that relationship's collapse in December. Last year, Israel Hayom published photographic evidence showing Izadi meeting with senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials during the height of the Gaza war. His extensive activities are now documented in unprecedented detail.
Critical Revelations A comprehensive report from the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center has unveiled a series of Hamas communications intercepted by the IDF during ground operations. These documents illuminate Izadi's instrumental role in strengthening the pro-Iranian axis, following the strategic vision laid out by Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani before his elimination in 2020.
This alliance encompasses Hamas, PIJ and Hezbollah among other groups. The research institute's analysis shows how the documents trace Izadi's evolution into a pivotal figure in Hamas relations, wielding significant influence over the terror organization's leadership decisions. The documents also reveal his involvement in strategic planning leading up to the October 7, 2023 terror attack.
“The documents expose fundamental challenges that emerged over years of building and connecting the various axis components, as well as Izadi's methods for addressing these challenges, which sparked internal Hamas power struggles between those favoring closer ties with Iran and those opposing increased Iranian influence under Khaled Mashal's leadership,” the report's authors explain.
They stress: “Our assessment indicates Izadi will maintain his central role in Iranian efforts to rebuild the ‘resistance axis,’ particularly Hamas and Hezbollah, in the aftermath of the war against Israel and the Assad regime's fall in Syria. We project that Izadi and the ‘Palestine Branch’ will prioritize weapons smuggling to Judea and Samaria, providing funding and attempting to execute attacks inside Israel, including assassination attempts against senior figures, as part of revenge operations for strikes against ‘resistance axis’ organizations and the Israeli attack on Iran in October.”
This is evidenced in a letter from Hamas's military wing leadership in Gaza to a senior official identified only as “Dear Brother Commander Mujahid” (likely referring to either Yahya Sinwar or Mohammed Deif). The letter praised their “victory” and expressed gratitude for axis support, particularly from Iran and the Revolutionary Guards, while recommending enhanced cooperation with the Guards.
“Our review of the cooperation achieved with our brothers in the Revolutionary Guards has made clear the necessity of elevating our coordination level with them,” the letter emphasized.
“This requires sending brothers who understand both enemy and friendly capabilities, possess decision-making authority, and can agree on unified strategies and organized steps to advance and activate all fronts against the Zionist enemy in any future campaign that the enemy cannot fight simultaneously, especially when activating Palestinians in the occupied interior and West Bank, along with Arab peoples in neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Lebanon.”
The documents reveal that on May 31, 2021, Izadi sent correspondence to Ismail Haniyeh congratulating Hamas on their “great victory.” He also expressed appreciation for Haniyeh acknowledging his role in a thank-you letter to Quds Force Commander Ismail Qaani. Izadi informed Haniyeh that an additional 10 million dollars had been allocated to Hamas's military wing and proposed arranging a meeting in either Iran or Lebanon. Haniyeh's response letter thanked both Izadi and Qaani for strengthening the “brothers in Palestine” through enhanced steadfastness, weapons capabilities, launch capabilities, and financial backing. He confirmed they would work to arrange meetings in both Iran and Lebanon within days.
Izadi's message to Haniyeh stated: “We want to inform you that an additional allocation has been made to the brothers in the Al-Qassam Brigades beyond recent transfers, amounting to (10 million). We hope to update them directly and are coordinating transportation arrangements. Furthermore, the Republic's leadership intends to support martyrs’ families in Gaza and assist homeowners whose houses were completely destroyed in the recent war through a ‘temporary shelter’ program. This will be administered through the Palestine Martyrs Foundation and we will provide full details regarding the amount, methodology and implementation plans.”
On June 5, 2021, a significant joint letter was sent to Saeed Izadi from three top Hamas military leaders – Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa. The letter celebrated what they called the “divine victory,” paid tribute to Qasem Soleimani, and expressed gratitude for Iran's assistance and readiness to join the conflict if needed.
The three Hamas leaders made an urgent appeal for Iranian support to rebuild their military capabilities, specifically requesting Saeed Izadi's intervention with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Quds Force Commander Ismail Qaani to secure 500 million dollars over two years for their anti-Israel operations. They pledged that all funds would be dedicated to their campaign against Israel, writing: “We collectively rely on your forceful support of our request to His Excellency the Master and Leader Ali Khamenei, and Brother Leader Ismail Qaani, to double your contribution toward the mission of liberating and eliminating the entity called Israel.”
Internal Power Struggles The documents reveal how Izadi viewed Hamas-Hezbollah cooperation in Lebanon as a strategic priority, working to establish clear boundaries, enhance coordination, and directly oversee the development of Hamas's Lebanese capabilities. Correspondence seized in Gaza exposed tensions between Iran and Hamas regarding the organization's activities in Lebanon, particularly evident in exchanges between Khaled Mashal and Marwan Issa dated May 22, 2022.
Mashal detailed his visit to Iran and meeting with Izadi's deputy, where they discussed Izadi's negotiations with Hassan Nasrallah concerning Hamas's Lebanon operations, as well as discussions with Haj Abdul Qadir, designated as the supreme overseer of Hamas activities in Lebanon. Mashal later met directly with Izadi in Lebanon to discuss specific details of the Hamas-Hezbollah cooperation agreement.
Mashal reported that Izadi described the Palestinian project in Lebanon as “a cornerstone of Iranian philosophy, aimed at uniting all nationalities – Lebanese, Iraqi and Yemeni – in the liberation project” – their term for the war against Israel.
However, Mashal outlined several historical concerns: Lebanon's complex sectarian and political landscape that traditionally resisted such initiatives, the complicated history of Palestinian presence in Lebanon and its negative legacy in Lebanese consciousness, plus recent events in Syria and Hezbollah's fears about Palestinian weapons potentially being turned against their forces within Lebanon. To address these concerns, Izadi proposed implementing strict weapons controls on Hamas in Lebanon and establishing clear command structure protocols.
In his detailed report to Issa, Mashal acknowledged being impressed by Izadi's vision for Hamas’ Lebanon presence, which called for approximately 2,000 operatives initially, with potential for expansion once Hezbollah's concerns were adequately addressed. According to Izadi's framework, Hamas's primary mission would be supporting Hezbollah's offensive operations.
Mashal emphasized that Izadi and Hezbollah harbored serious concerns about Hamas's Lebanese presence, particularly regarding their possession of missiles and drones and the potential for uncoordinated attacks against Israel. To alleviate these concerns, Izadi insisted that command authority over Lebanese forces must rest with Hamas leadership in Gaza rather than its external leadership – a clear attempt to maintain control over Hamas's military wing in Gaza.
Mashal strongly opposed this arrangement, reporting that discussions with Iranian representatives became quite heated. He firmly rejected Gaza-based control over Lebanon operations, insisting instead that external leadership under his authority should oversee the project. Mashal concluded his letter to Issa by presenting two options: either accept Izadi's terms or proceed independently without Iranian agreement. “My recommendation is to disregard the Haj's position,” Mashal advised – further evidence of the growing rift between Izadi and Mashal over spheres of influence within Hamas.
A subsequent September 2022 letter from Mashal described another contentious meeting with Izadi's representatives, where he faced accusations of deliberately undermining the Lebanon initiative. Mashal reported defending his position by distinguishing between his personal views and Hamas's official stance. Izadi's deputy strongly urged Mashal to reconsider, emphasizing the project's critical strategic value. The deputy noted that Hamas's involvement would significantly expand their operational capacity, particularly in southern Lebanon's Sunni villages where Hezbollah lacked influence, and stressed that Iran was counting on Hamas rather than PIJ for this mission.
Later in this letter, Mashal recounted a direct meeting with Izadi (referred to as Haj Ramadan), where he confronted accusations that his team was spreading misinformation and attempting to blame him for the project's slow progress. Mashal insisted that Hamas must retain full operational control in Lebanon, including rules of engagement decisions.
“During my final meeting with Haj Ramadan,” Mashal wrote, “I confronted him about false information circulating among your colleagues in the Guards and the party [Hezbollah], portraying me as the obstacle to the jihadi project. He smiled and responded, ‘I haven't briefed them on recent developments or your brother's refusal abroad. I'm not concerned about presenting these details to them, so they remain fixed on the initial narrative that you're unwilling to manage the project.’ I asked him about their progress, to which he replied, ‘While we proceed with training to save time, try to convince your brother about the project's importance and viability. Those coming from Gaza need not stay permanently – we can implement a two-year trial period until mutual trust is established.'”
Beyond these tensions, extensive correspondence between Izadi and Hamas leadership reveals his persistent efforts to restore relationships between various factions. In a June 8, 2022 exchange between Haniyeh and Izadi, the latter detailed his diplomatic efforts to persuade Hamas leadership to formally restore relations with Syria. Izadi described multiple meetings with senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan and Hassan Nasrallah, emphasizing the need for careful messaging from Hamas leaders regarding Syria. Once again, Mashal and his supporters were specifically criticized for opposing reconciliation with Assad.
According to the research institute's documents, Izadi presented evidence of Hamas elements actively supporting anti-Assad rebels. Haniyeh responded with a commitment to transform relations with Syria and implement the agreed normalization with Damascus. Haniyeh, who was later eliminated during the current conflict, acknowledged awareness of “certain elements within the movement resisting this direction” but promised concentrated efforts to shift this internal dynamic.
“In light of your valued correspondence,” Haniyeh wrote, “and given our understanding of both internal and external factors affecting these relations, we will certainly undertake extensive efforts to cultivate an appropriate atmosphere for implementing this decision. Ongoing consultation and cooperation remain essential. We deeply appreciate the efforts by His Excellency and yourself with the Syrian state, which have helped foster a positive and respectful foundation for these relations.”
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