The fact that Israel urged Qatar to increase aid to Gaza has been known for a long time, but the alleged involvement of Netanyahu's office officials in “laundering” the emirate's image must be thoroughly investigated. We must not accept a reality where senior officials in the prime minister's environment work for an entity that is not defined as an enemy state, but functions as such in every way. And despite the beating of war drums in the cabinet after Trump's “hell” declaration, no minister said what Israel would do differently compared to the last 16 months.
Qatar
There is no escaping investigating the suspicion of Qatari involvement at the highest levels of Israeli leadership. The suspicions and stench are too heavy for this affair to be allowed to fizzle out. Moreover, there is concern that behind the heavy smokescreen, additional issues are hidden, which are not known, whose severity is even greater.
Let's put things in order for a moment. Qatar is not the main funder of Hamas. Iran has been responsible for most of the organization's military budget in recent years. It transferred billions to it in various ways – from weapons smuggled into Gaza through tunnels and physical money transferred in various ways, to the “hawala” method – transferring money through money changers, mainly in Istanbul and Beirut.
The method is simple: The funder (Iran) transfers the cash to money changers abroad, let's say $10 million. They receive it and contact money changers in Gaza with whom there is absolute trust. The Gaza money changers hand over $10 million in cash to Hamas. They receive the physical money from the sale of goods purchased abroad with the original money and imported to Gaza.
Israel has been fighting terrorism financing for over two decades. The great difficulty is in locating its sources. Sometimes these are charity organizations spread around the world that collect money from innocent people for good causes – widows, orphans, treating the wounded, and more. They transfer the money through bank accounts to organizations registered in Gaza. Some of it reaches its destination: the other part, sometimes the main part, is taken by Hamas.
In 2002, Meir Dagan, then head of the Counter-Terrorism Bureau, established a unit called “Tzaltzal” that sought to block and dry up the financial sources of terrorist organizations. When he moved to serve as head of the Mossad, “Tzaltzal” moved with him and also flourished there. Dagan nurtured it and saw it as an additional weapon in the campaign against terrorism, not an exclusive weapon but one that would certainly make life difficult for it. This succeeded to a large extent in certain places and to a lesser extent in others, but it gave terrorist organizations and those who fund them (mainly Iran) a headache and led to methods developed by the unit being adopted by various countries, led by the U.S.
After Operation Protective Edge, Israel allowed Qatar to transfer money to Gaza to assist in the reconstruction of the Strip. This was a mistake: under the guise of civilian aid, the main door to terrorism financing in Gaza was opened. Senior Tzaltzal officials tried to protest but encountered a sealed door. Prime Minister Netanyahu refused to act on the matter, and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen lost interest in the unit until he led to its closure in 2017. A year later, it was indeed re-established under the Economic Warfare Headquarters (MATAL) in the Ministry of Defense, but it was no longer the same. In the absence of the operational and intelligence power of the Mossad, this struggle lost its strength. The direct result was that money flowed more easily to terrorist organizations, to establish and oil the machine that was operated on October 7. Those who think the lesson has been learned are mistaken: those in the know testify that even today this struggle is conducted clumsily, and with only partial efficiency.
Back to Qatar. In an effort to curb the security escalation, Israel decided in 2018 to allow it to increase aid to Gaza. The term “decided to allow” is a bit misleading, because Israel actually urged Qatar to do so out of the thought that money would buy quiet. Here too, the factors that promoted the issue were Netanyahu and Cohen, who acted on his behalf (on one of his trips to Qatar, he joined the then commander of the Southern Command, Hertzi Halevi). Thus were born the suitcases of dollars, which turned into ongoing funding of $30 million a month and were used for various matters – from genuine support for the wretched in Gaza, to practical support for Hamas and its civilian and military goals.
This quiet exploded with a loud noise at 6:29 on Black Saturday, but Qatar paid no price. Israel needed it again, this time to mediate in the release of the hostages. Qatar is a known mediator, which has previously assisted in the release of hostages from terrorist organizations in the Middle East and Africa. Its critics argue that some of these organizations were funded by it to increase its influence and with the aim of granting itself immunity from them. It even hosted (and hosts) some of the leaders of these organizations regularly in Doha. The Taliban found a warm home with it until it returned to power following the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and Hamas operates its foreign apparatus from its soil – whose leaders were partners in the preparations for October 7.
The Qatari interest is not limited to terrorism. The strategy of the small emirate is to buy as much influence as possible wherever possible. The Qataris invest in banks, and invest in real estate, and invest in giant companies, and invest in politicians, and invest in media. The success is dizzying in every field: from the World Cup they hosted (with heavy suspicions of corruption in the background) to Al Jazeera, which is the largest and most influential media network in the Arab and Muslim world. In between, their myriad financial investments yielded huge profits and also great influence on the economy and politics in many countries, including the U.S. and Western Europe.
At some point, it appears, Qatar began investing in Israel as well. Presumably, it did so to buy influence and immunity for itself – sometimes in that order and sometimes in reverse. It's unclear who received what, but it's clear there is an incident. It started with an unconfirmed or denied report of tens of millions of dollars allegedly allocated to Netanyahu's campaign, continued with a report on the employment of Netanyahu's advisers Jonathan Urich and Shralyq Einhorn in a campaign aimed at improving Qatar's image during the World Cup, and ended (as of now) with a report by Ofer Hadad on Channel 12 News this week that Eli Feldstein, our acquaintance from the classified IDF documents theft case, was employed by Qatar during the war to assist in the same ongoing matter of improving its image.
These allegations are too serious to simply be left hanging in the air. They are joined by a steadily lengthening trail of other question marks that are wrapped up in the same tangle. For example, the fact that Feldstein worked in the Prime Minister's Office (as a military spokesman) but did not receive a salary, and if so – who did pay him? For example, the fact that he regularly briefed reporters on issues related to Qatar, while being careful to highlight its “positive” part. For example, the fact that he allegedly received from his partner in the document theft, Ari Rosenfeld, classified information concerning Qatar, and it's unclear what was done with it.
Netanyahu, his associates, and his various emissaries are not responding to these affairs. One can only imagine what they would have done if the prime minister had been Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, or someone else. What a carnival would have been held here around “traitors” with foreign funding, and around harm to state security: After all, this is the same group that attached the root B.G.D (Hebrew for “betray”) in all its conjugations to every possible person and body, and now it turns out that from within it were those who were allegedly funded by the same entity that simultaneously funded Hamas. And we're not talking about small fry but some of Netanyahu's senior advisers, who enjoy free access to him and also to information in Israel's most sensitive nerve center.
Investigation
This affair has several potential aspects. One, criminal – if it turns out that there were those who received money from Qatar and passed forbidden information to it or carried out actions on its behalf that went against Israeli interests. The second, economic – if it turns out that money was paid or received illegally. The third, administrative – if it turns out that advisers who worked in the Prime Minister's Office acted simultaneously and without reporting also for a foreign and hostile entity. And the fourth, public-civil – from the very knowledge that senior officials in the prime minister's environment worked for pay for an entity that is not defined as an enemy state but functions as such in every way.
All of these can only be clarified through an investigation. The media cannot do the work instead of the investigators, because it does not enjoy the same tools and access to information sources. But meanwhile, the investigative bodies are sleeping, and the only unit that is active is the media. This is a lot, but it's not enough: The stench here is so heavy that it requires a thorough investigation.
There are three bodies in Israel that can conduct such an investigation. The first is the Israel Police, whose performance in the various cases already under investigation raises serious concern if there is still a police force here. The second is the Shin Bet, whose head Ronen Bar is engaged in an escalating struggle against Netanyahu and his emissaries who will argue that this is an investigation designed to fabricate cases against the prime minister to grant Bar immunity. The third is the Director of Security of the Defense Establishment, which enjoys extensive investigative powers, although under the current defense minister it is likely that they will be steadily cut.
Among these three bodies, only the Shin Bet will be able to conduct a thorough investigation that will lead to a clear bottom line from which it will be possible to learn who worked and who paid and who received what and in return for what. Bar can decide on such an investigation himself (this has not happened yet), Netanyahu can order him to open such an investigation (this will not happen), and the request/instruction can also come from the attorney general (it's unclear if this will happen).
The prosecution was more concerned this week with filing unnecessary indictments against the prime minister's spokespeople in the witness harassment case than investigating the current affair, which has already been dubbed “Qatargate”. It seems that it will take a few more publications and exposures by journalists until such an investigation is opened, and even then – it's not clear how far it will go, and to be precise: Did Netanyahu know that his close associates allegedly received money from Qatar in exchange for various services. For those who forgot, we'll remind you that even in the documents affair, they initially claimed in the prime minister's environment that they didn't know Feldstein, who later became in their words an “Israeli patriot” (a direct quote from Netanyahu), and regarding the documents themselves, evidence is mounting that Netanyahu was also allegedly exposed to them – mainly to the one famous document that was published in the German Bild to torpedo a hostage deal.
Netanyahu will of course do everything so that this affair is not investigated, just as he is doing everything so that a state commission of inquiry into the October 7 failure is not established. Yes, the same failure that was made possible due to a severe intelligence and operational failure, but also because Hamas managed to build itself up with generous assistance from Qatar. Yes, the same Qatar that Netanyahu supported bringing in as a central funder of Hamas, the same Qatar that his close advisers are suspected of working for.
Five observations
First, regarding the hostages. Last Saturday's release was dramatic. The returned hostages, especially Or Levy and Eli Sharabi, provided significant information about many other hostages and their condition. This underscored how urgent the need is to complete the mission and bring everyone home before it's too late.
In the coming days, Israel will try to expand phase one of the agreement to include more living hostages defined as “humanitarian cases.” It's unclear if Hamas will agree, and if so – what they'll demand in return, but it seems that despite strong opposition in the government, Israel should make every effort in this direction, as it's purely about saving lives.
The second observation is about the war. Israel prepared this week to resume it if the deal falls apart. The defense around Gaza was significantly bolstered out of concern that Hamas might try to attack (with the limited forces it has left), and additional forces were brought in case offensive action is needed again. The beating of war drums heard from the cabinet accompanied these preparations dramatically, but none of the ministers answered the obvious question of what Israel intends to do differently from what it did in the last 16 months. How this time, if it happens, will Hamas be finally defeated, and how do you do that when there are still 76 hostages in Gaza whose return is a central goal of the war.
The answer is that Israel has no answer. The government is hiding behind President Trump and his promise of “hell.” It's not too late to demand that it fulfill its duty to the public that elected it and ensure its security and future – and not to effectively privatize our national interest to a foreign entity, friendly as it may be.
The third observation is about humanitarian aid. At the core of the claims accompanying Hamas's announcement this week to suspend the implementation of the agreement was the delay in bringing equipment into Gaza, especially caravans and tents intended to house many Palestinian war refugees. The claims were directed at Israel, but they were a pressure lever designed to cause Jerusalem to push the mediators, and for them to pressure those supposed to supply the equipment to Gaza – in this case, Turkey.
On Wednesday night, understandings were reached that seemingly allowed a return to the agreed path. This will be finally confirmed if Hamas adheres to the agreement and provides today a list of three male hostages, alive, who will be released tomorrow. Even if this happens, the next crises are already looming, and it's advisable to prepare for them: Those who want war would do well to define its objectives in advance and clarify how they intend to achieve them. This is the minimum required for the hostages and for the soldiers who will die along the way.
The fourth observation is about the draft evasion law. Representatives from several groups and organizations of reservists recently met with Defense Minister Yisrael Katz. They left shocked. Some claimed that he was more interested in his phone than in the meeting (he wasn't), but the more significant claim is that he simply isn't well-versed in the details. They argue that he's shooting slogans that contradict the IDF's needs and capabilities, and that he's mainly determined to buy quiet so that he can advance the law that will effectively exempt ultra-Orthodox Jews from conscription.
This situation cannot persist for any reason, especially in light of the possibility that Israel may resume fighting in Gaza – a move that would require mobilizing tens of thousands of reserve soldiers for an unknown period. Even if the war does not resume, the burden placed on the IDF is enormous on all fronts, and it is imperative to share it more equitably and fairly. Katz, for those who have forgotten, is supposed to be the Minister of Defense: so far, he's acting more like the Minister of Coalition Defense.
The fifth observation concerns the next General Staff. This week, Eyal Zamir's appointment was approved by the Senior Appointments Committee, and he will replace Herzi Halevi on March 5. Zamir returned to uniform this week – for now only as a major general – and began touring IDF units in various sectors. Simultaneously, he is working on assembling the General Staff that will accompany him. His deputy is expected to be Tamir Yadai, who retired and will now return. This is a good pairing, which should lead a process of deep rehabilitation in the IDF, but its success also depends on the level of backing it will receive from the government and its leader, who, following Katz's conduct, need to remember that the IDF is not theirs and is not meant to serve them, but the State of Israel.
The post Netanyahu's top aides and Qatar: A strong stench of money appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.
