Seventeen months after the October 7 attack, a comprehensive IDF investigation reveals that the Nahal Oz base stands as one of the military's greatest failure points. The battle's devastating outcome: 53 soldiers and officers killed in combat and 10 soldiers kidnapped to Gaza, including seven female spotters. This occurred from a total force of just 162 personnel stationed at the base that morning, with only 81 actual combatants.
Being a military installation, this incident produced the most documented investigation – captured by cameras inside the base, on armored vehicles, and even by the terrorists themselves. While the situation across Gaza border communities remained unclear to division commanders and General Staff that morning, the severe crisis at Nahal Oz was known to leadership from the beginning due to consistent reporting from the base. This explains why the location received the most airstrikes on that horrific morning.
IDF faults exposed across the board
The devastating battle at Nahal Oz represents a systemic failure in IDF preparedness for a wide-scale ground attack under rocket fire. According to investigators, the failure wasn't one of conception but rather the absence of the most basic IDF principles that should have been applied that morning and during the long period preceding it.
Retrospective analysis of Hamas's invasion plans clearly shows that the organization specifically targeted Nahal Oz base as a key objective within its operational strategy. For years, Hamas gathered intelligence on the base through direct observation from Sajayia (which overlooks the camp), drone surveillance, and information collection from inside the camp via social networks and IDF media publications.
Documents captured from terrorists contained precise diagrams of the base, including locations of shelters, generators, and security cameras. They knew exactly who occupied which rooms, sleeping arrangements, command post location, fighters’ weaponry, and more. In their meticulous planning, Hamas analyzed access routes to the camp, terrain passability, agricultural cover areas, fence vulnerabilities, and other tactical details.
Video: Footage showing the kidnapping of IDF female field observers on Oct. 7 by Hamas terrorists
Military investigators note that Hamas prepared for the raid with precision comparable to special forces planning, modifying their approach based on gathered intelligence. Captured terrorists possessed detailed maps with specific takeover plans for each section of the base and instructions for individual terrorists detailing their positions, vehicle assignments, and required weaponry. Their strategy was to attack broadly during minimum force deployment (Saturday and holiday), employing deception tactics, rapid breaching, and overwhelming firepower. The terror organization calculated that reaching the camp within fifteen minutes would ensure victory.
On Friday, October 6, around 6:00 p.m., Hamas's raiding platoon commanders received their briefings. Junior operatives were briefed between 9:00 PM and midnight, while cell commanders received instructions between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m..
The IDF, meanwhile, had fallen into a years-long complacency. For an extended period, forces stationed at the camp never trained for defending against a direct attack, despite being located just 850 meters from the border fence. No defense protocol existed in standing orders against a ground raid. The investigation found that when Battalion 13 entered operational deployment in the sector, they conducted a thorough process within the parameters defined for them.
One reasonable scenario forces should have prepared for involved raids by two different Hamas Nukhba companies targeting different IDF battalion areas in a concentrated brigade effort, striking an outpost or settlement. The objective in this scenario would be kidnapping and conducting mass killings. Forces should have also prepared for barrier area raids or fence-crossing attacks toward outposts or settlements. The more dangerous scenario (considered less likely) involved concentrated efforts by two Gaza brigades with coordinated raids by three Nukhba companies from different battalions in staggered but closely timed assaults.
On October 7 morning, Nahal Oz camp maintained full routine operations without any warnings or unusual reports, operating with reduced personnel according to weekend and holiday guidelines. Security consisted of a gate guard, an administrative soldier guarding the armory, a balloon operator, and another soldier monitoring communications in an armored vehicle. The base housed forces from Battalion 13 of the Golani Brigade (designated as the Nahal Oz battalion combat team), two tank teams from Brigade 7, a collection platoon from Battalion 414, and additional support personnel.
After 4:00 a.m., a perimeter fence sensor triggered an alert that prohibited movement on a nearby route. The incident concluded after a few minutes and was later assessed as unrelated to the main attack.
At 5:30 a.m., the deputy commander of the 13th Battalion, serving as sector commander that morning, conducted a situation assessment while implementing limited “dawn readiness” procedures (with only selective positions fully manned) according to standard protocols. A company commander headquarters departed the Nahal Oz camp with two reconnaissance vehicles, while a readiness force consisting of a tank and APC remained stationed in the nearby “Black Arrow” area.
The IDF divided Hamas’ attack on Nahal Oz camp into four main phases according to the timeline, with the first fifteen minutes proving decisive.
Phase One: Enemy infiltration and fighting (6:29-8:20)
At 6:29, intense barrage fire targeted the camp as female spotters reported enemy approaches to the fence. Soldiers followed their only known procedure – running to shelters – having received no other training for base attacks.
Female spotters (field observers monitoring the Gaza border from the command center) followed their protocols, moving to observation positions to identify possible raids. Two spotters identified terrorists approaching the fence, and at 6:31, the sector commander reported terrorist infiltrations across multiple border points over radio, declaring a “complex event” of ‘Purple Rain’ (rocket fire) and “Turkish Horsemen” (infiltrators) throughout the sector. At 6:33, a female spotter identified the first explosion at the primary fence, and Company Commander Major Shiloh Har Even declared a confirmed complex event.
After communicating with the Northern Brigade commander in the Gaza Division, the deputy battalion commander left the camp to prevent infiltrations into nearby settlements. Meanwhile, commanders inside shelters organized combat forces to reinforce defensive positions. Major Har Even, who was on patrol, directed a tank to take position with an APC behind it to identify and eliminate infiltrating enemies. Two Golani fighters ran to reinforce their comrade at the camp – these three fighters fought heroically and became the last position to fall within the camp.
At 6:37 a.m., two trackers abandoned the camp while the third, Chief Warrant Officer Ibrahim Haruba, chose to remain – becoming another hero in this account. At this time, spotters identified an explosion in the secondary fence – the final barrier between Gaza and the camp. Just two minutes later, dozens of terrorists reached the breach only 850 meters from Nahal Oz camp.
By 6:45 a.m., most fighters present had rushed to defensive positions, except for the reinforcement force that had just arrived at the gate. At this point, tanks began moving according to readiness protocols, but a quarter-hour after the attack began, approximately 65 terrorists from the first wave had already reached the camp.
The investigation noted a profound cognitive disconnect between what soldiers had been trained for and the reality they faced. Even under heavy attack, one soldier still asked whether he had permission to use explosive ammunition.
At 6:55 a.m., during engagement with the main terrorist force, the deputy commander of the 13th Battalion was wounded. His fighters attempted medical treatment, temporarily pausing combat operations. By 7:04, all personnel who had been reinforcing positions retreated toward shelters due to overwhelming terrorist fire. A minute later, the first terrorists breached the camp as a platoon commander reached the command post, reporting extensive infiltration while ordering all armed personnel to engage the enemy.
At 7:00 a.m., five minutes after the deputy battalion commander was wounded, the Northern Brigade commander contacted Company Commander Har-Even by radio, instructing him to assume command with the primary mission of preventing kidnappings. This indicates the brigade commander quickly became aware of the deputy commander's condition and understood the battle situation. In the following minutes, the company commander attempted to establish situational awareness with female spotter platoon commander Shir Eilat.
Meanwhile, terrorists continued infiltrating the camp, using holes beneath perimeter concrete barriers as firing positions to target any soldiers visible inside. At 7:09 a.m., female personnel in the command post initiated position abandonment procedures upon realizing terrorists had reached the command post entrance.
Around 7:15 a.m., 13th Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Greenberg arrived from home and, unable to contact Major Har Even, transferred command to the Support Company Commander.
According to investigation findings, gate defenders fought courageously against superior terrorist numbers, killing several before being overcome around 7:30 a.m. , when all three defenders were killed. This position then became an entry point for additional terrorists.
While these events unfolded in the camp, Major Har Even attempted to stabilize the situation at Black Arrow, directing his tank to engage infiltrating terrorists. At 7:40 a.m. , Har Even's force arrived from Black Arrow and entered the camp battle. Despite losing his hand from a wound, Har-Even continued fighting, maintaining composure in radio communications.
At 7:43 a.m., the first air force attack drone arrived but, unable to establish contact with ground forces for targeting guidance, fired at the soccer field.
By 7:46 a.m., terrorists overwhelmed the women's shelter. Ten minutes later, the two company commanders coordinated an attempted linkup at the entrance gate to regain control. “It's you and me against the whole world now,” the Support Company Commander told the wounded Major Har Even. Despite his severe injury, Har Even declared himself sector commander and prepared an offensive to retake the camp. While the Support Company Commander diverted toward Kfar Aza following reports of infiltration there, Har Even led two tank teams, an APC, and infantry from his company toward the camp. His entire force, except for the radio operator, was killed in a deadly ambush at the camp entrance.
Meanwhile, the women's shelter housed 31 female soldiers, only six armed, with one untrained in weapons use. When the first terrorist entered, they managed to wound him before terrorists threw three grenades inside. The women successfully repelled two grenades. Fourteen female soldiers escaped through the northern shelter exit. When terrorists breached the shelter, one armed female officer struggled with a terrorist attempting to seize her weapon before being fatally shot. The terrorists then bound the remaining women and searched for those who had escaped.
At 8:40 a.m., two airstrikes targeted areas near the female spotters’ quarters, driving terrorists away and saving eleven female soldiers’ lives.
Hamas terrorists at the Nahal Oz outpost
Phase Two: Continued fighting (8:20 a.m.-12:00 p.m.)
Forces continued engaging terrorists, sustaining casualties. At 8:53, a tank still fighting in the camp was disabled by two anti-tank missiles. Meanwhile, air support targeted areas in and around the camp. The second tank joined an APC, moving to the western section to prevent kidnappings.
Around 9:00, the tank identified a second wave of approaching terrorists. After directing helicopter fire toward them, the crew charged the terrorists in open terrain. At 9:02, the tank reached the northwestern corner outside the camp before being disabled by an anti-tank missile. Later, another missile strike injured the crew. Around 10:00, a third terrorist wave arrived and kidnapped the tank crew. The APC, now with only three fighters remaining (others having been injured after dismounting earlier), broke contact and later joined the fight at Kfar Aza.
By this stage, no forces operated outside shelters within the camp. All personnel had fortified positions inside shelters. According to evidence collected by investigators, kidnappings from Nahal Oz camp began around 10:00, with seven female spotters taken captive from their shelter around 10:20.
Throughout this period, terrorists attempted to breach the command post but encountered determined resistance from two platoon commanders, a Golani fighter, and tracker Haruba. All staff officers and female spotters had taken refuge in the back room. Haruba assumed command, refusing terrorist demands to surrender. He called his family and told the female spotters it would be his greatest honor to die for them and the country.
Aircraft attempted to prevent a fire in the command post but failed. During communication with the Northern Brigade Commander, Haruba was heard choking, reporting that terrorists had thrown something inside. Fire then broke out, filling the space with smoke. Five officers, one soldier, and one female spotter managed to escape – six through a bathroom window and one through another exit. All others perished. In retrospect, investigators noted the difficulty in judging those who sought self-preservation by moving toward light, while emphasizing IDF doctrine that commanders should exit after soldiers, female fighters after female soldiers, and all military personnel after civilians. Fifteen soldiers and commanders died in the command post.
Despite the clear threat – no adjustments made against raids
The main conclusions from the investigation deal with the surprise, and the fact that the camp did not function as an outpost and was not prepared for defense, combat capability, and staying in the camp. The camp was not planned against a ground attack and the protected areas in it provided a response only for high-trajectory fire, not terrorist infiltration.
Despite the command post being defined as a defense target, and being the closest and most threatened on the border, its protection was defined only for high-trajectory fire, and no adjustments were made against raids. Also, the definition of readiness state did not match, in time and space, the threat that could reach the camp in a vehicular ground raid, as analyzed by the brigade. Also, there was no existing defense plan for non-combat forces, such as the female spotters, and the possibility of an attack on the camp as analyzed in the brigade's reference scenario was not trained for. These gaps, the investigation determined, led to severe damage to non-combat forces and the ability of combat forces to defend the camp.
It further emerged that the surprise attack led to some of the commanders in the field being killed within a short time, and the forces operated in a disorganized manner without orderly commands. The investigation team positively noted the commanders’ decisions to send their forces to fight in the nearby kibbutzim and protect the residents rather than fighting in the camp. Also positively noted was the performance of the female spotters and the commander of the collection platoon who continued to provide operational reports to forces with composure despite the many enemies in the camp. The team recommended awarding citations to a number of male and female soldiers and officers.
